



Directorate of
Intelligence

MASTER FILE COPY

**DO NOT GIVE OUT
OR MARK ON**

~~Secret~~

25X1

141

Africa Review

25X1

30 May 1986

~~Secret~~

ALA AR 86-011
30 May 1986

Copy **385**

Page Denied

Secret

25X1

Africa Review

25X1

30 May 1986

		<i>Page</i>	
Articles	South Africa: Plight of Black Police	1	25X1
			25X1
	Black police, who are widely regarded in the townships as traitorous enforcers of apartheid, have been frequent targets of violence by militants. The loyalty of black police to the government is still firm, but it will be tested severely as unrest continues.		25X1
	Zimbabwe: Intraethnic Frictions on the Rise	5	25X1
			25X1
	Frictions among Shona officials in the government and ruling party may worsen unless Prime Minister Mugabe, whose style of consensus government often conceals indecision and prevarication, moves forcefully in the months ahead to contain the rivalries.		25X1
	Kenya: Crackdown on Dissident Group	9	25X1
			25X1
	President Moi has cracked down in recent months on Mwakenya, an underground Marxist-Leninist organization drawn largely from the Kikuyu, Kenya's largest ethnic group.		25X1
Briefs	Zimbabwe: Air Force Problems	11	25X1
	Zimbabwe-Malawi: Mugabe Pays a Call	11	25X1

Articles have been coordinated as appropriate with other offices within CIA. Comments and queries regarding this publication may be directed to the Chief, Production Staff, Office of African and Latin American Analysis,

25X1

25X1

Secret

25X1

Africa Review

25X1

Articles

**South Africa:
Plight of Black Police**

25X1

Black police, who are widely regarded in the townships as traitorous enforcers of apartheid, have been frequent targets of violence by militants during the past 20 months. The government nonetheless plans to expand greatly the number of black police and, largely because of high black unemployment, its recruiting efforts have been extremely successful. The loyalty of black police to the government so far has remained firm, but will be tested severely as unrest continues.

Enemy of the People

Apartheid laws make no exception for black police, who must live in black townships where all residents with ties to the government are potential targets for militants. A government spokesman said last month that police have sustained heavy casualties since the violence began—33 dead, 584 injured—and that most of those killed or injured have been blacks. The homes of over 800 black policemen have been attacked.

The violence has severely disrupted the lives of black police, forcing many to move their families into makeshift facilities at heavily guarded police stations or Army bivouacs at the edges of townships. The government recently built 56 houses in an isolated area south of Johannesburg for the families of local black police whose homes had been razed. The Dutch Reformed Church has created a special fund to provide for black police who have lost their homes. The violence has forced some children of black police to attend schools in relatively peaceful areas of the homelands or to take correspondence courses, according to press reports.

The government contends that black police have remained loyal despite intimidation tactics and African National Congress radiobroadcasts urging



Police recruits in training

Abbas/Gamma-Liaison ©

them to sabotage equipment, burn down stations, and resign. Although no reports of police defecting to join militants have surfaced, the South African media have highlighted a few instances in which blacks resigned because of the mounting pressures. The government apparently tries to reduce the affinity black security personnel might have for rioters by sending police from certain tribal groups into areas predominantly populated by blacks from other hostile tribal groups, according to press reports.

Growing Police Manpower

Government spokesmen recently have noted—in our view, accurately—that the present size of the South African Police (SAP)—a 48,000-man, national paramilitary force—is grossly inadequate to suppress antigovernment violence and lower the high crime rates prevalent in most black urban areas. The government plans to add 8,000 new members to the SAP this fiscal year, and President Botha recently

Secret

 ALA AR 86-011
 30 May 1986

Secret

announced that the SAP will grow to 87,000 during the next 10 years. The Minister of Law and Order, however, publicly admitted later that it may take up to four additional years to complete the buildup, although police training facilities already are being expanded to accommodate more recruits and many new stations are planned, mostly in black townships.

Government spokesmen say that record high numbers of blacks are applying to join the SAP, whose membership is about 40 percent black. We believe the high black unemployment rate—about 30 percent nationwide and as high as 60 percent in some areas—is a major factor driving blacks to apply, despite daily attacks on black police and their families. South African press interviews indicate that many black police are extremely conservative and strongly opposed to black activists who resort to violence.

Black Municipal Police

White local government departments that administer black townships as well as many black local authorities have long hired security personnel known as “blackjacks.” Their duties usually have been restricted to guarding official property in the townships. Many white municipalities, meanwhile, employ police units separate from the SAP to enforce traffic laws and municipal regulations.

The government announced in January 1985 that some black local authorities would be given control over new black police units. The Minister of Law and Order told a journalist the following month that the so-called black municipal police would be separate from the SAP and responsible only for guarding local government property and enforcing municipal regulations by serving summonses and seeking out residents who owe rent and utility fees. The government gradually has increased their authority, in January empowering them to carry out certain functions normally performed by the SAP. Last month, government spokesmen announced plans for black municipal police to investigate all criminal offenses in their municipal areas and to operate at times outside of their own immediate areas.

The local police units, in our view, are designed primarily to help shore up the black government system that is threatening to collapse completely as a result of widespread attacks by militants against black councilors since September 1984. The government also may hope that eventually local black authorities commanding their own black police units will be able to quell township disturbances without involving the SAP, and by extension, the white government.

Recruitment for the municipal police has been successful. Pretoria allocated about \$10 million to black local authorities last October to assist in the formation of municipal police units, and according to press reports in March, more than 8,000 black men and women are serving in these units; 4,850 members belong to units among the 40 black town and village councils and 3,500 others work for black community councils.

The government has established a special Training and Planning Committee to coordinate and monitor training, according to press reports. The committee is led by an official from the Department of Constitutional Development and Planning (CDP). Other committee members head the 10 training centers. Six centers operate under the auspices of the CDP. The remainder are administered by the South African Defense Force (at the Lenz army base near Johannesburg), the SAP (at the Hammanskraal police training site), the South African Railway Police (at Slagboom near Kirkwood), and the Soweto Town Council (at Tladi College).

The reaction among blacks to the new units generally has been negative. Many black activists believe that the presence of the units adds to the volatility of the townships. Some community groups vigorously oppose the units, arguing that funds devoted to the police—amounting to several millions of dollars per year in some townships—could be used more effectively to provide much-needed housing.

25X1

25X1

25X1

25X1

25X1

25X1

25X1

25X1

Secret

Secret

Outlook

The expansion of the SAP and the introduction of black municipal police units are unlikely to have any major impact on the violence in the short term. Despite being severely overmatched already in terms of firepower, crowds of young blacks today continue to confront the security forces in the townships. When the planned police buildup is completed, however, the government hopes to have a much greater ability to control domestic unrest without using the Army, a move that has divided white opinion and fueled foreign criticism. [REDACTED]

25X1

The government is not likely to face large-scale defections among black police or insurmountable problems in finding black recruits in the foreseeable future. Historically, the white minority regime in southern Rhodesia experienced almost no defections from its largely black security forces despite their being targeted by insurgents. We believe that blacks who belong to the police have little incentive to resign because most are unlikely to be "forgiven" by their communities. South Africa's mediocre economic prospects—including likely increased black unemployment—suggest that the government will continue to find blacks to fill police posts despite the social stigma and growing risks that go with the job.

25X1

25X1

Secret

Zimbabwe: Intraethnic Frictions on the Rise

25X1

Recent events in Zimbabwe underscore the deep intraethnic frictions that pervade senior levels of the government and the ruling party, the Zimbabwe African National Union (ZANU). While most ZANU and government leaders are Shona speakers, they belong to several distinct subgroups that have long vied for influence within the party and more recently within the government. []

The US Embassy in Harare reports that intra-Shona frictions are likely to continue and may worsen unless Prime Minister Mugabe—whose style of consensus government often conceals indecision and prevarication—moves forcefully to contain the rivalries in the months ahead. Moreover, [] should Mugabe continue to temporize, he risks limiting his freedom of movement on other important domestic issues, such as the prosecution of senior government officials on charges of corruption or efforts to merge with Joshua Nkomo's opposition Zimbabwe African People's Union (ZAPU). []

Tribalism Goes Public

Defending himself against a corruption charge during a parliamentary debate in March, Transport Minister Ushewokunze, a Zezuru, broke taboo by leveling public charges of tribalism against unnamed colleagues within ZANU and accusing them of the assassination of ZANU leader Herbert Chitepo in 1975. Embassy reporting indicates that Ushewokunze's comments were widely perceived as an attack on the Karanga and specifically against Deputy Prime Minister Muzenda and Eddison Zvobgo, the Minister of Justice, Legal, and Parliamentary Affairs. []

Our interpretation of Embassy reporting, however, leads us to suspect that Ushewokunze's outburst was designed to distract attention from charges of corruption that had been made against him only days before in Parliament by Karanga politician Byron Hove—at Zvobgo's urging. Ushewokunze is an

accomplished player of intertribal politics himself, according to Embassy reporting, and almost certainly must have anticipated the problems his comments would generate. Zvobgo, as well, no doubt understood the tribal dimension of his anticorruption campaign against Ushewokunze. []

25X1

Intratribal tensions in ZANU intensified in the weeks following Ushewokunze's public statements: Mugabe expelled Ushewokunze from ZANU's Politburo and Hove from the Central Committee, and Karanga and Zezuru politicians traded insults at a stormy Central Committee meeting on 12 April. These events created a mood of edginess in the military in mid-April, and several Karanga Army officers allegedly caused unspecified incidents, according to Embassy reporting. []

25X1

25X1

Tensions To Continue

While the political situation has calmed considerably since mid-April and appears outwardly quiet, ethnic frictions continue to simmer. US Embassy [] reports that the Karanga remain angry about Hove's dismissal and concerned about further moves against them, including the possibility that the Zezuru will move to take disciplinary action against Zvobgo. Meanwhile, senior Zezuru politicians have made strong representations to Mugabe to refrain from firing Ushewokunze from the Cabinet for fear such a move would be interpreted by the Karanga as a victory in the deepening tribal frictions. []

25X1
25X125X1
25X1

Our interpretation of reporting from the US Embassy in Harare suggests to us that this recent incident may be more serious than earlier outbursts of tribal tensions. There are aspects of this flareup that could portend increased ZANU infighting:

25X1
25X1

25X1

- The rivalry of two of ZANU's best known hotheads. Both Zvobgo and Ushewokunze are noted for their intelligence, ambition, and unpredictability as well

Secret

ALA AR 86-011
30 May 1986

Secret

Key Shona Subgroups

The 6-million-plus Shona speakers in Zimbabwe are the country's largest ethnic group. They make up over 70 percent of the total population and occupy most of the eastern two-thirds of the country as well as substantial territory in the western one-third. Ndebele speakers, the largest minority ethnic group, constitute approximately 15 percent of the total population and occupy much of the remaining western third of the country. []

Subgroups within the Shona reflect differences of dialect, culture, and region. Indeed, most Shona speakers—especially rural dwellers—identify themselves by their subgroup rather than as members of the larger Shona ethnic group. Key Shona subgroups include:

- *The Karanga. The largest Shona subgroup (27 percent of the tribe), they reside in Masvingo Province as well as in parts of Midlands and southern Matabeleland. Deputy Prime Minister Simon Muzenda is their informal leader and the senior Karanga in ZANU.*
 - *The Zezuru. The second-largest subgroup that comprises 22 percent of the Shona population. The Zezuru, which includes Prime Minister Mugabe, hail from the provinces of Mashonaland West Central and East.*
 - *The Manyika. They comprise 16 percent of the total population and reside largely in Manicaland Province. Since ZANU's inception in 1963, the Manyika have pooled resources with the Zezuru to prevent the numerically superior Karanga from dominating ZANU affairs.*
 - *The Korekore. Residing in the northern sections of Mashonaland West and Central, they comprise 15 percent of the Shona. Cultural and linguistic similarities with the Zezuru, coupled with the lack of influential Korekore at senior levels of the party and government, have led the Korekore to collaborate closely with the Zezuru on most major political issues in ZANU.* []
-

as their capacity to make trouble and take risks. While both may currently be keeping their heads down, they are unlikely to do so indefinitely.

- The addition of Deputy Prime Minister Muzenda to those who are resentful of Mugabe's moves toward the Karanga group. As informal leader of the Karanga, Muzenda previously played an important moderating role, cautioning other, younger Karanga against making precipitous judgments or moves on tribal grounds. The Deputy Prime Minister's disaffection with the Zezuru bodes ill for a quick containment of Karanga frustrations, and may stem from recent Zezuru efforts to replace him.
- The spillover of intra-Shona frictions into the military. The Embassy reports that Air Force Commander Josiah Tungamirai is among the Karanga in the armed forces who are resentful over Zezuru-Manyika efforts to dominate ZANU.
- Finally, our reading of several reports from the Embassy [] suggests that anti-Mugabe sentiment is growing among his own Zezuru group. Should he continue to remain aloof from the recent tribal tensions, Zezuru frustration will probably grow. []

Outlook

Mugabe so far has avoided taking sides, probably a sensible policy considering possible repercussions in the politically charged atmosphere. Yet over the longer run, the US Embassy is probably correct in its judgment that Mugabe's continued inability to deal forcefully with the tribalism issue increases prospects for further factionalism. Personalities like Ushewokunze and Zvobgo will not let the issue fade away. []

While our reading of the available reporting does not suggest to us that Mugabe currently faces a direct challenge to his rule, it does point up a leadership weakness—his tendency to temporize in the hope that a problem will go away. Mugabe's behavior is likely to encourage his opponents and hinder action on important domestic issues. With tempers running high over ethnic matters, Mugabe is unlikely to rush into

25X1

25X1

25X1

25X1

25X1

Secret

Secret

making major decisions on a merger with ZAPU for fear of fueling Zezuru fears about a Karanga alliance with the Nkomo's Ndebele supporters. And yet such a merger—if worked out judiciously—is probably Mugabe's best bet in defusing troubles in Matabeleland. In addition, the Prime Minister will probably avoid strong action on eliminating growing corruption. Many senior officials suspected of being corrupt are Zezuru or Karanga, and prosecution of them at this time no doubt would be perceived as tribally motivated. Finally, even though much needed, Mugabe is unlikely any time soon to reorganize and streamline the Cabinet because this would upset the existing tribal balance.

25X1

25X1

Secret

Kenya: Crackdown on Dissident Group [REDACTED]

25X1

President Moi has cracked down in recent months on Mwakenya, an underground Marxist-Leninist organization drawn largely from the Kikuyu, Kenya's largest ethnic group. Police have arrested about 30 members of the group since January, and Moi has ordered a full-scale investigation by his internal security services. Although Mwakenya, Swahili for *Front for the Liberation of Kenya*, poses no immediate threat to his regime, Moi probably is trying to prevent the group from expanding beyond its largely civilian intellectual base into the armed forces and other sectors of society. [REDACTED]

Background and Goals of Mwakenya

We believe the group was founded in the mid-1970s, possibly in reaction to the assassination in 1975 of J. M. Kariuki, a radical Kikuyu Member of Parliament. According to its propaganda, Mwakenya was formed to bring an end to what it regards as Kenya's fascism. Mwakenya's publications advocate "scientific Communism," formation of a front of revolutionary groups under Mwakenya's leadership, and the installation of a "Kenya People's Socialist Republic." A pamphlet published in January 1985 espouses the spread of revolutionary theory to workers and peasants. [REDACTED]

Citing Kenya's increasing political repression, denial of basic human rights, and the one-party dictatorship of the dominant Kenya African National Union, Mwakenya went underground with its Marxist line shortly after its founding, and some of its members reportedly went into exile. Most individuals linked to Mwakenya are university students or teachers, and the majority are Kikuyu. [REDACTED]

Mwakenya's publications list the assassination of Kariuki, the coup attempt in August 1982, and student unrest as opportunities for the group to begin its revolution. Blaming its missed chances on poor organization, Mwakenya now believes commitment, discipline, and quality in cadre are essential for success. [REDACTED]

Government Actions

The government crackdown stems from the arrest of a Nairobi University student—who has also studied in the USSR—following his attendance at a Mwakenya recruitment meeting in August 1985. [REDACTED] his interrogation led to the arrest of four Soviet-educated University of Nairobi lecturers in February. More arrests followed in March and April. [REDACTED]

25X1

25X1

25X1

The government has tried a few of those arrested for producing seditious literature and is preparing charges against several others. [REDACTED]

25X1

25X1

25X1

[REDACTED] Moi delayed the trials of most of those arrested, however, to permit the security services to press ahead quietly with their investigation without alerting Mwakenya members to the full scope of the government's knowledge of the organization's activities and membership. Mwakenya has since stepped up its production and circulation of propaganda tracts, [REDACTED] and now calls for "total war" against the Moi government. [REDACTED]

25X1

25X1

Moi's Views

Although the group's activities have increased somewhat despite the investigation, Moi appears to be in command of the situation. [REDACTED]

25X1

25X1

25X1

25X1

25X1

Secret

ALA AR 86-011
30 May 1986

Secret

Moi has demonstrated since his presidency began in 1978 that he can manipulate and play upon divisions among the Kikuyu, and he appears capable of handling the Kikuyu-dominated Mwakenya. Recent Embassy [] reporting has indicated that Moi orchestrated a campaign this spring by his parliamentary and party supporters to limit the influence of Vice President Mwai Kibaki, Kenya's senior Kikuyu politician. Moi, a member of a small Kalenjin tribe, also probably is concerned that the Luos—Kenya's second most powerful ethnic group—might ally with the Kikuyu and threaten his position. So far, however, only two Luos have been arrested as suspected Mwakenya members []

25X1

25X1
25X1

Moi is most upset over the university intellectuals at the hub of the group, [] and the Embassy reports that Moi warned local leaders about bearded intellectuals directed by "foreign masters." Moi's distrust of intellectuals, in our view, almost certainly stems from his own limited education. []

25X1
25X1

[] the discovery of overseas dissidents in the ranks of Mwakenya probably concerns Moi as well. []

25X1

25X1

25X1

25X1

Outlook

Despite Mwakenya's activity, we believe that Moi is not seriously threatened and that his security forces are capable of containing the dissidents but not eliminating them. Mwakenya is unlikely to expand its influence to other groups such as the politicians and the armed forces, because its Marxist-Leninist line lacks broad appeal in Kenya. The dissidents will probably not gain much sustenance from the expatriates, although Kenya's relations with those various countries harboring dissidents may become strained. []

25X1

25X1

Secret

Secret

Africa Briefs

Zimbabwe

Air Force Problems []

25X1

The Zimbabwean Air Force is suffering from a severe shortage of skilled pilots that has left it heavily dependent on the few whites remaining on active duty, [] only white helicopter pilots were involved in recent military operations in Mozambique because only they were considered skilled enough to handle close-support combat missions. Morale among black pilots has declined and several have feigned illness to avoid operational assignments in Mozambique. [] believes many black pilots were drafted solely on the basis of their academic background and do not enjoy flying. []

25X1

25X1

25X1

Nearly all of the estimated 20 remaining white pilots have said they intend to leave the Air Force within the next five years. Although more than 100 Zimbabweans are being trained as pilots in China and Libya, we believe—in view of the low morale and unhappiness with the government's recruitment policies—that these new pilots will be unable to compensate for the loss of skilled whites and that the Air Force's operational capability will continue to decline. []

25X1

Zimbabwe-Malawi

Mugabe Pays a Call []

25X1

Zimbabwe Prime Minister Mugabe's four-day official trip to Malawi in early May was his first visit to that country since Zimbabwe's independence in 1980. If Mugabe had hoped to persuade President Banda to join the Frontline States in condemning South Africa's domestic and regional policies—as suggested in [] —the Zimbabwean leader was probably disappointed. Banda, at a dinner in honor of Mugabe, failed to echo Mugabe's criticism of Pretoria and instead noted recent moves by South African President Botha toward granting limited recognition to blacks and coloreds and indicated his willingness to do whatever he could to further such initiatives. Malawi, under Banda's rule, is the only Organization of African Unity (OAU) state that maintains diplomatic relations with South Africa. []

25X1

25X1

25X1

These divergent points of view did not prevent the two countries from concluding agreements on trade, air services, and general cooperation. Nor did Malawi's diplomatic ties to Pretoria deter it from issuing a joint communique that called for the immediate implementation in Namibia of UN Security Council Resolution 435 and the abolition of apartheid. The communique also expressed concern over the destructive economic consequences for both nations of "armed bandits in Mozambique," a reference to the insurgents that have disrupted Malawi's rail links through Mozambique and led Zimbabwe to station several thousand troops in

Secret

ALA AR 86-011
30 May 1986

Secret

Mozambique to guard its vital oil pipeline and railway links to the port of Beira. The inclusion of Zimbabwean Gen. Rex Nhongo in the delegation to Malawi suggests to us that another reason Mugabe traveled to Malawi was probably to discuss the Mozambican insurgency and perhaps options these countries might pursue to assist beleaguered Mozambican President Machel in dealing with it. Mozambique suspects that South Africa continues to provide limited military aid to the insurgents in violation of the 1984 Nkomati Accord. In addition, Maputo and Harare believe that some South African aid is funneled through Malawi via sympathetic local officials, and that Banda turns a blind eye.

25X1

Secret

Secret

Secret